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Mutual Learning in Development 
Cooperation: China and the West*
Jiantuo Yu1 and Evan Due2
Abstract This article looks at some of the characteristics of 
China’s foreign aid system and its development over the years. 
It discusses China’s foreign aid based on its own development 
experiences and its view of South–South development 
cooperation. Both the modalities and narratives of China’s 
international development cooperation need to be considered 
in order to better understand the complexities, strengths, 
and weaknesses of its aid system. As China’s international aid 
continues to grow and become more prominent, particularly in 
the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, the article calls for a 
deeper understanding of China’s aid institutions and the need for 
greater cooperation and capacity building.
Keywords South–South cooperation, China’s foreign aid; Belt and 
Road Initiative, international development cooperation.
1 Introduction
China’s foreign aid practices have attracted much global 
attention over the past decade. But China’s foreign aid is not a 
recent phenomenon, as implied by the term ‘emerging donor’. As 
widely cited, China has been extending international assistance 
as far back as the 1950s. However, only recently have the 
magnitude and character (both institutional and policy make-up) 
of China’s foreign aid and international development cooperation 
dramatically changed.
The presence of foreign aid from China alongside the Western aid 
system led by the international financial institutions and the club 
of bilateral donors represented in the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has become a topic of much discussion 
outside of China (Woods 2008; Brautigam 2011; Gu et al. 2014; 
Dreher and Fuchs 2016; Nowak 2015; Brazys and Vadlamannati 
2018; Regilme and Hartmann 2018). Indeed, surprisingly few 
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studies have actually come from within China, suggesting 
that this has not been a subject of much internal debate. As 
China is now an influential player in international development 
cooperation, inadequate dialogue, misunderstanding, and a 
prevailing lack of trust between China and the Western donor 
communities make cooperation between the two sides difficult 
and exacerbate uncertainties of the current global order.
This article tries to address the recognition gaps between 
China and Western societies by reviewing China’s involvement 
in international development assistance. It seeks to highlight 
aspects of China’s evolving foreign aid system, alongside its 
efforts to engage as a global partner in promoting global 
development and working towards the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Section 2 provides a short overview of China’s 
foreign aid, and Section 3 describes the evolution of China’s aid 
practices with some observations on current trends. Section 4 
discusses what China, as a developing country and a donor-
recipient, can contribute to global development based on the 
conceptual framework of modernisation for the majority. This 
is followed by a critical analysis in Section 5 on the weakness 
of China’s current aid architecture and discusses what China 
can learn from previous lessons and experiences of Western 
counterparts. Section 6 concludes the article.
2 China’s foreign aid: an overview
China became an aid donor, in the modern sense,3 in 1950, soon 
after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. However, 
unlike other donors responding to the reconstruction needs 
of the post-Second World War era at the time, China was a 
poor developing country coming out of revolutionary conflict, 
and aid cooperation was seen as a political imperative for 
relations with its neighbours. Fast forward to today, and China 
is now a significant bilateral donor and a major contributor of 
development financing to the multilateral aid system (Kitano and 
Harada 2014). It is a major provider of humanitarian aid (alongside 
its growing commitments to United Nations (UN) human security), 
and a significant contributor to global public goods – notably in 
combating climate change and in addressing health needs as 
a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. It also is a core partner and 
financier of multilateral institutions.
2.1 A cursory glance
According to the official White Papers published by the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China (SCIO 2011, 2014, 2021; 
Zhang 2021), China has allocated cumulatively CNY 615.83bn 
(around US$130.8bn) for foreign aid projects estimated from the 
1950s to the present, of which CNY 270.2bn (around US$42bn) was 
disbursed during 2013–18. The components of Chinese aid are 
classified into three broad areas: grants, interest-free loans, and 
concessional loans.4
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Although the aggregate amount of foreign aid has been relatively 
large over the past decade, China’s annual appropriation for 
development assistance is actually quite modest compared 
to Western counterparts (Li 2019). According to estimations 
conducted by Kitano and Miyabayashi (2020), China’s net official 
development assistance (ODA) increased by more than eight 
times, from US$0.7bn to US$6.8bn during 2001–19. However, even 
with this significant increase, the ratio of China’s net ODA to that 
of the United States was only one fifth (Figure 1).5
The composition of China’s foreign aid experienced a 
fundamental shift after 2010. Figure 2 shows the proportions of 
the three categories of foreign assistance: grants accounted 
for the largest proportion of China’s foreign assistance during 
1950–2009, and interest-free loans and concessional loans almost 
had equal shares. However, concessional lending overtook grants 
as the largest part of foreign assistance during 2010–18, though 
the latter’s share was up slightly, and the share of interest-free 
loans decreased significantly during the same period (see 
Figure 3). This also marked the period when overseas Chinese 
foreign direct investment into developing countries expanded 
greatly, encouraging concessional lending to be linked with 
investment projects.
2.2 Categories and allocation of aid
Focusing only on expenditure underestimates China’s overall 
foreign assistance contributions. According to China’s official 
classification, China offers aid in terms of eight categories 
or forms, some of which are not recorded in expenditure 
terms. These include what are defined in China’s system as: 
Source Authors’ own, based on Kitano and Miyabayashi (2020) and OECD 
data set (OECD n.d.).
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complete projects; goods and materials; technical cooperation; 
human resource development cooperation; medical teams sent 
abroad; emergency humanitarian aid; volunteer programmes 
in foreign countries; and debt relief. A wide variety of types of 
aid fit in the above categories. Although imprecise in terms 
of development accounting or reporting as done by Western 
donors, these categories do indicate the types of assistance 
and policies that China pursues in its development cooperation. 
This has implications for how aid is accounted for and managed, 
and presents some challenges for statistical recording and 
comparisons.
Table 1 shows the change in complete projects. Providing 
complete projects is a very popular aid type adopted by China. 





Figure 3 China’s foreign aid structure, 2010–18






Figure 2 China’s foreign aid structure, 1950–2009
Source Authors’ own, based on SCIO (2011, 2014, 2021).
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with public facilities accounting for the largest part in terms of 
the quantity of completed projects (44.12 per cent), followed by 
industry projects and economic infrastructure projects. However, 
the share of industry projects has declined dramatically since the 
mid-1980s as many recipient countries have accelerated their 
pace of privatisation in the industrial sector (Li 2019). The share 
of public facility projects increased significantly, accounting for 
around three quarters of the total during 2013–18, with education 
and health projects comprising the majority type of aid. It is not 
clear as to the distribution of financial resource inputs in these 
projects. Yet according to SCIO (2014), economic infrastructure 
projects – mainly including roads, electricity, telecommunications, 
Table 1 Change in complete projects in 1950–2018
1950–2018 1950–2009 2010–12 2013–18
Type of complete 
projects
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Public facilities 1,336 44.12 670 33.09 360 62.07 306 72.34
Economic 
infrastructure
626 20.67 390 19.26 156 26.90 80 18.91
Agriculture 283 9.35 215 10.62 49 8.45 19 4.49
Industry 655 21.63 635 31.36 15 2.59 5 1.18
Others 128 4.23 115 5.68 0.00 13 3.07
Total 3,028 100.0 2,025 100.0 580 100.00 423 100.00
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from SCIO (2011, 2014, 2021).




Figure 4 Chinese aid allocation by region, 1950–2012
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and broadcasting – comprised the largest share in 2010–12, 
accounting for 44.8 per cent of the total financial resources input.
According to data released by SCIO (2011, 2014), Africa has been 
given more priority in Chinese aid. In terms of magnitude of financial 
resources allocated by region, Africa accounted for 47.28 per cent 
of the total, followed by Asia (32.21 per cent) and Latin America and 
the Caribbean (11.59 per cent) respectively (Figure 4).
3 Evolution of China’s foreign aid practices since 1978
China’s foreign aid practices have evolved over the years in 
accordance with international and domestic circumstances. 
During the formative years (1950–78), China’s foreign assistance 
was largely motivated to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist 
camp and to support its global campaign of anti-imperialism 
and anti-colonialism. In this stage, China had developed core 
thinking about development assistance in terms of technical 
cooperation and ‘South–South cooperation’, a concept borne 
out of the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955 and which 
remains a defining feature of China’s conceptualisation of aid.
Embodied in the ‘Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical 
Assistance to Other Countries’ (Yu 1992: 610), this forms the 
ideological basis for China’s engagement with other developing 
countries, and the primacy of recipient-led development which 
today colours much of aid discourse. There have been dramatic 
changes to China’s aid system in terms of motives, methods, 
and policy considerations since the adoption of the reform 
and opening up policy in 1978, though China’s commitment to 
developing countries and some key principles have been followed.
3.1 Transformation
In late 1978, China adopted its reform and opening up policy. 
As argued by Deng Xiaoping, ‘peace and development are the 
main themes of our era’ (Deng 1994: 105); such a prediction on 
the status quo and trends of the global environment laid a solid 
foundation for China’s domestic market-led economic reforms. 
These far-reaching economic reforms, which continue with 
modification, unlocked unprecedented growth averaging over 
9 per cent and set in motion an extended period of economic 
development, poverty reduction, and institutional and social 
change. On the international front, Deng Xiaoping suggested 
that China ‘keep a low profile’ and should ‘never be the leader of 
any (ideological) camp’ (ibid.: 363), though the former has often 
been translated, perhaps wrongly, as to ‘conceal one’s abilities 
and bide one’s time’. Although the reform period was entirely 
domestic in nature, the expansion of industrial capacity and 
trade set the stage for a fundamental shift in foreign policy from 
passive to active engagement (Deng 1994).
As China’s economic policies mobilised resources for rapid 
economic expansion at home – complemented by aid from Japan 
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and Western nations – China also expanded its international 
investment and foreign aid. Deng Xiaoping underscored the 
concept of ‘mutual development’ and ‘mutual benefit’, situating 
foreign aid as a tool in its foreign policy (Johnston and Rudyak 
2017). In accordance with the shift from a centralised planned 
economy to a socialist market economy, economic rationality, 
fiscal affordability, and long-term impacts on recipient countries 
began to guide the provision of development assistance.
China attached considerable importance to capacity building 
in recipient countries and focused on technical training in its 
aid regime. By the mid-1990s, however, China began to diversify 
into development projects in the form of economic infrastructure 
financing. The Export-Import Bank of China and the China 
Development Bank were established during this period and 
started to play an important role in development financing. 
Foreign aid became more compartmentalised in terms of 
technical cooperation on the one hand, and the provision of loans 
for investment projects on the other, where lending from the policy 
banks fell to the authority of various state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) according to their areas of competence of mutual interest.
3.2 Going global
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 
brought about further changes to China’s domestic economic 
development and the landscape of global economic power. 
By the end of the 1990s, China’s stock of accumulated foreign 
direct investment accounted for around a third of all foreign 
direct investment to developing countries, enabling Chinese 
firms to become major investors abroad. Accession induced 
more domestic reforms and economic liberalisation, laying the 
framework for deeper integration into the global economy. 
Throughout this period, the ‘going out’ strategy to promote 
Chinese investment abroad incentivised more and more Chinese 
enterprises supported with concessional financing, similar to the 
tied aid that benefited Japanese firms.
The strategy was made clear in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10) 
which both encouraged Chinese enterprises to actively 
participate in international and regional cooperation mechanisms 
and overseas investment projects, and to increase Chinese aid 
to other developing countries and further strengthen economic 
and technical cooperation (SCIO 2006). Foreign aid was seen as 
integral to China’s ‘going out’ policy and of opening up to the 
outside world through participation in international economic 
and technical cooperation. This explicitly embedded international 
development assistance within the narrative to:
actively participate in the international regional economic 
cooperation mechanism, strengthen dialogue and consultation 
and develop bilateral and multilateral economic and trade 
cooperation with all countries. Actively participate in the 
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formulation of multilateral trade and investment rules and push 
the establishment of the new international economic order… 
and to increase Chinese aid to other developing countries.6
Throughout this period, China had begun to utilise both grant aid 
and concessional financing, along with technical assistance, in a 
much more integrative fashion with SOEs and private firms. This 
was driven less by external demand than by a supply-side push, 
due to the high accumulation of foreign reserves and savings, and 
the less than favourable returns from external holdings, such as 
US treasury bills. By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, domestic 
concerns over large foreign exchange reserve holdings, and 
excessive supply capacity in manufacturing and industry, drove 
more aggressive spending abroad, including utilising foreign aid 
as a means to crowd in pent-up commercial investments.
In tandem with its proactive international trade and investment 
strategy, China initiated aid consultations with developing 
countries through multilateral forums and regional groupings. 
These included increasing aid commitments in forums such 
as the UN High-Level Meeting on Financing for Development, and 
the UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, 
as well as regional arrangements including the Forum on China–
Africa Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
the China–Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, 
the China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development 
and Cooperation Forum, the Forum on Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking 
Countries, and the China–ASEAN (Association of South East Asian 
Nations) forum. These served as venues to deepen development 
cooperation in a range of fields (agriculture, infrastructure, 
education, health care, human resources, and clean energy). 
South–South cooperation became the basic modality for the 
implementation of foreign aid (Zhang 2012).
It was also realised and made clear in policy formulations that 
China’s own national development and modernisation depended 
on a peaceful international environment and collaborative 
relations with other countries (Xia and Jiang 2004). Thus, from 
the perspective of idealism, peace and development should be 
pursued because they are common human values and China 
as a responsible developing country should get involved in this 
process (SCIO 2011, 2014, 2021). From the perspective of realism, 
however, based on China’s own experience, development itself 
was seen as the most effective means to cope with crime, 
inequality, and social and economic instability. Thus, providing aid 
to developing countries would help China benefit from a peaceful 
and cooperative international environment (Zhou 2008; Zhang 
2008; Yang and Chen 2010).
China’s segmented, uncoordinated, and less organised foreign 
aid system was nevertheless also not clearly aligned with its 
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investment policies, and this led to both a haphazard approach 
to the provision of aid alongside economic investments, as well 
as a misunderstanding more broadly as to the use of aid as a 
foreign policy instrument (Zhou 2010, 2012; Xue 2014; Li et al. 2014; 
Li 2019).
3.3 Strategic upgrade and the Belt and Road Initiative
China’s economic and social development began to trend 
towards rebalancing and deepening reform with the 12th and 13th 
Five-Year Plans, and correspondingly, moves towards increasing 
China’s presence on the international stage. This also served 
to accelerate the provision of foreign aid. Following the 18th 
Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), many 
new initiatives were launched expanding the use of foreign aid 
alongside economic investment agreements with developing 
countries around the world. In late 2012, China proposed the 
establishment of ‘the community with shared future’, so as to 
cope with the common challenges faced by the world in the 
twenty-first century. The policy direction was not only a response 
to global challenges such as climate change, global security, 
and health pandemics, but also a signal to the US and Western 
powers of China’s increasing involvement in global affairs and 
governance with respect to global public goods.
In 2013, President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, known later as the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), set an important milestone for 
China’s international development cooperation and foreign aid. 
In addition to having established new development agencies and 
financial entities – such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund – the 
BRI was articulated as an inclusive framework for international 
development cooperation with regional parameters, promoting 
commercial cooperation and Chinese foreign assistance for 
infrastructure development, connectivity, and poverty reduction. 
By the end of 2020, China had signed 203 cooperation 
documents with 138 countries and 31 international organisations 
to jointly promote the Belt and Road Cooperation, exceeding the 
framework of the previous South–South cooperation modality 
and opening up a new international paradigm for development 
cooperation.
The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–20) is perhaps the most explicit 
strategic document setting out the policy framework for 
international investment and development cooperation. This 
included moving forward with improving bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms of the BRI, strengthening multilateralism, and helping 
to reform international economic governance. Foreign aid played 
an important role in this context, not only through increased 
finances for expanding cooperation, but also in improving China’s 
aid implementation system so as to be an active partner in the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
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The establishment of the China International Development 
Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018 is a significant step in 
this direction. It is part of an overall effort in constructing a 
more modern architecture of foreign aid and development 
cooperation, seeking to formulate strategic guidelines, plans, and 
policies for foreign aid, and to coordinate and offer advice on 
major foreign aid issues. CIDCA is mandated to advance China’s 
reforms in matters involving foreign aid, and to identify major 
programmes and supervise and evaluate their implementation. 
As it currently stands, the institution is at an early stage of 
building its own capacity, and this requires assistance and 
cooperation from other agencies and departments within China, 
as well as engagement internationally with other bilateral and 
multilateral agencies responsible for administering and managing 
development assistance. Although there is much that needs to 
be improved, the contour of the modernised architecture of the 
development cooperation system has started to take shape.
4 Modernisation for the majority: China’s possible contribution to 
global development cooperation
4.1 Rethinking foreign aid from the perspective of modernisation 
for the majority
‘Modernisation for the majority’ (多数人的现代化) (Deng 1987, 2012) 
is a conceptual framework first introduced by the late Chinese 
economist Deng Yingtao. As reflected in his books and articles, 
Deng argued that, for about two centuries, only a minor group 
of people, mainly concentrated in developed societies, could 
lead a modern life under the Western model, which he called 
modernisation for the minority (少数人的现代化). However, if the 
majority of the world’s population want to lead modern lives, 
or modernisation for the majority, the ways of industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and resource use should be fundamentally 
changed (ibid.).
Chinese policy analyst and advocator Lu Mai further developed 
this framework by arguing that, when China, together with other 
emerging economies such as India, Brazil, and Russia, achieve 
modernisation, the majority of the world’s population will then 
be able to lead modern lives, and it will be easier for these 
newly modernised countries to work with the developed world 
to help other developing countries. Lu Mai argues that China’s 
aid to developing countries will help to promote the process of 
modernisation for the majority (Lu Mai 2014, 2017).
This conceptual framework could be used to understand 
the increasing role of China in foreign aid and international 
development cooperation. From China’s perspective, its foreign 
aid is embedded within a South–South cooperation framework, 
where the norms, standards, and accounting procedures that 
govern aid practices among the DAC group of donors do not 
apply. Nonetheless, China now sees itself as a major actor in the 
foreign aid arena with increased obligations in the governance 
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of international development finance. China’s role as a donor 
should therefore be considered not solely from the platform of the 
DAC club of donors, but also from the perspective of Southern 
partners and within a South–South cooperation narrative, in 
concert with wider multilateral forums such as the G20. Reform 
of the international aid architecture that emphasises inclusivity 
could be part of the unfolding agenda of what is termed in China 
as ‘modernisation for the majority’.
However, modernisation for the majority will not be achieved 
automatically and without challenges. There are various 
obstacles hindering the modernisation of developing countries, 
and two kinds of gaps that are particularly challenging among 
them. One is the financing gap. To date, there is a huge gap 
between the official aid provided by OECD countries and the 
demand of developing countries. As reported in OECD (2020), 
on average, DAC members provide about 0.3 per cent of gross 
national income (GNI) to official aid, while the suggested level by 
the UN is 0.7 per cent. It is estimated that the financing gap is 
US$2.5tn per year to achieve the SDGs (United Nations 2019).
The other is the knowledge gap. Development knowledge, to 
a large extent and for a long time, had been centralised in 
Western-style thinking and narratives. More importantly, as 
argued by the Korean development economist Ha-Joon Chang, 
the West has always tried to teach developing countries things 
they have never done (Chang 2011). On the other hand, voices 
and experiences from the developing world have not been given 
enough attention (Li 2019).
4.2 What can China contribute?
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and 
particularly since the launch of its reform and opening up policy, 
China has made significant progress in modernisation, economic 
growth, and poverty alleviation. Today, China sees that its fiscal 
capacity and experience drawn from its own development can 
be used to help the international community mitigate the two 
gaps mentioned in Section 4.1.
4.2.1 Mobilising financial resources and providing alternate 
innovative forms of development financing
The influence of China’s foreign aid remains modest in terms of 
its share in global aid. However, financial resources mobilised by 
China have been steadily increasing over the years and is set 
to expand further, whereas aid from the DAC donors has been 
declining in both real and nominal terms. Moreover, China has 
been introducing new innovative mechanisms of development 
financing through the BRI and its financial institutions. These 
mechanisms are providing developing countries with alternate 
sources of financing, including addressing associated issues 
of debt management through new modalities of repayment, 
coupled with stress measures and ‘lines of forgiveness’. China’s 
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development financing approach to projects, while following 
market principles, allows for alternative forms of scheduling, 
payments, and project management which are carefully worked 
out with recipients in accordance with their practices, capacity, 
and sets of interests. This flexibility allows for negotiations that 
have proven to be attractive for recipient countries, including 
accelerated project appraisals and approval mechanisms.
4.2.2 Mobilising resources for economic infrastructure investment
The global shortage in investment funds for infrastructure 
development is huge. However, China’s own development 
experience through infrastructure investment has provided it 
the capacity and technical know-how to fill some of the gaps 
in infrastructure financing and project implementation (Yu 2018). 
Whereas multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have over the 
years reduced their commitments to hard infrastructure financing, 
China has excelled in this direction by providing developing 
countries new alternatives and modalities. China has been looked 
to by other developing countries as offering a development 
partnership model for infrastructure development that is both 
efficient and integrated. What is needed at this stage is greater 
cooperation, particularly from countries that have long experience 
in this sector such as Japan, as well as multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank and regional development banks.
4.2.3 Promoting development knowledge sharing
Sharing knowledge and promoting capacity building is a key 
pillar of China’s foreign assistance, based on its experiences as 
a developing country and recipient of aid. China has developed 
over the recent past a significant number of training and 
capacity-building programmes that have benefited a large 
number of officials, professionals, and students from developing 
countries. It has also established specialised institutes, such as 
the Institute of South–South Cooperation and Development, for 
the purpose of promoting knowledge sharing between China 
and other developing countries (SCIO 2021). Efforts are underway 
to greatly expand these initiatives to support skill development 
and strengthening capabilities in a range of fields catered to 
the needs of developing countries, but China is also looking for 
increased institutional collaboration with other Southern donor 
partners, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa.
4.2.4 Promoting the governance of international development 
cooperation
It is imperative that the international community enhances its 
coordination efforts in international development cooperation, so 
as to respond to global challenges such as climate change and 
the health pandemic, and to achieve the SDGs and modernisation 
for the majority in the longer term. As China is now taking a 
leading role in South–South cooperation, it could further promote 
the cooperation and coordination of development assistance 
practices between traditional and emerging donors. China has 
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always emphasised the importance of respecting recipient 
countries’ right to independently select their own path and model 
of development and believes that every country should explore a 
development path suitable to its actual conditions.
China’s aid approach is to shift the accountability framework 
to the aid recipient, with consideration of their socioeconomic 
circumstances and historical background, and to promote 
a South–South model absent of political conditions. China’s 
approach emphasises inclusivity, but from the position of 
a recipient. What this offers is a different model whereby 
cooperation can provide space for multiple actors, including 
non-governmental and private sector interests and where 
accountability is not to the donor but to the recipient.
5 What can China learn from Western donors?
5.1 Integrating the international development cooperation system
Foreign aid and international development cooperation covers 
numerous areas and requires the engagement and coordination 
of various governmental departments, civil society organisations, 
and the private sector. China is currently at a critical juncture in its 
development of foreign aid as a policy tool. For a long time, there 
have been approximately 30 governmental departments involved 
in aid affairs but no systematic and efficient coordination among 
these departments and other entities. Hence, the system has 
become highly fragmented. While there is a clear policy direction 
as articulated by the Chinese Communist Party and through the 
State Council, the implementation and provision of assistance 
through various agencies and institutional arrangements 
has made coordination and alignment with the international 
development cooperation system cumbersome and difficult.
The founding of the CIDCA is an important step to integrate the 
current development cooperation system. However, the role of 
CIDCA is mainly in back-stage management and coordination, 
focusing more on providing guidance, planning, offering advice, 
and supervising. CIDCA itself lacks the capacity to manage 
or implement aid projects and to effectively allocate specific 
assignments to different departments. Institutional strengthening 
of CIDCA, and greater alignment under the supervision of 
the State Council, is a process that will require both internal 
cooperation and adjustments, as well as learning, cooperation, 
and partnership with the international aid community and 
recipient countries.
5.2 Building capacity in international development cooperation
China seriously lacks expertise and personnel in international 
development cooperation. Very few universities in China have 
majors related to international development, and there are 
even fewer research establishments devoted to the study of 
international development, global governance, and public policy. 
In addition, training programmes in international development are 
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in short supply. This situation is particularly dire for CIDCA where 
there are few staff and even fewer with the kinds of experience 
needed for the broad and important mandate of the institution. 
Having institutional linkages with other bilateral and multilateral 
donors would be an important step in building institutional 
capacity as well as human capabilities. This could be in terms of 
training and experiential learning offered by other aid agencies, 
but also include efforts to build understanding through staff 
exchanges, joint activities, and institutional linkages.
5.3 Developing necessary infrastructure
Project information on aid and other international development 
affairs has been scattered among different government 
departments, policy banks, and SOEs. Regular statistical systems, 
standards, and frameworks on international development have not 
yet been established. This makes planning, supervision, evaluation, 
and research of international development cooperation very 
difficult, and leads to unnecessary misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of Chinese aid and development cooperation 
programmes. Working with the OECD-DAC and other bilateral 
donors to develop and modernise China’s statistical framework, 
databanks, and other development infrastructure is necessary.
5.4 Improving communication with the existing community of 
international development cooperation
It is important and necessary for each country to develop its 
own language and narratives on international development 
based on its practices. However, it is also necessary to be able to 
communicate effectively such narratives to a variety of audiences, 
locally and internationally, in order to build understanding and 
acceptance by stakeholders and the general public. Efforts to 
improve elements of strategic communication, media platforms, 
international engagement, and other aspects are necessary 
to not only improve transparency, but also to generate public 
support and acceptance.
5.5 Involving the private sector and civil society organisations in 
international development cooperation
China’s SOEs have been playing a very important role in 
implementing aid projects throughout China’s history because 
many of them, particularly those in areas of engineering 
procurement construction, are pioneers in doing business 
abroad, even much earlier than the adoption of the reform and 
opening up policy. However, with more and more private Chinese 
enterprises engaged in international business, it is necessary 
for China to get them involved in international development 
cooperation projects. Encouraging more non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to participate in international development 
is also a common practice. It is also promising to share knowledge 
and work together with foreign partners, including multinationals, 
global NGOs, and multilateral organisations, to provide 
foreign assistance.
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6 Concluding remarks
The increasing involvement of emerging donors such as China 
is not an isolated phenomenon. In this article, we have argued 
that the modalities of China’s efforts in foreign assistance are 
necessary and inevitable from the perspective of modernisation 
for the majority. With the rise of Southern countries, there will be 
more opportunities to mitigate financing and knowledge gaps 
and accelerate the pace of modernisation for those countries left 
behind for centuries.
Specifically, there are critical areas where China can contribute 
to global development cooperation, including mobilising 
more development finance resources, investing in economic 
infrastructure, sharing development knowledge, and promoting 
governance of the global development cooperation system. 
However, there is still much room for China to further improve 
its development cooperation system and to learn from its 
Western counterparts, including strengthening integration of 
the system, modernising its statistical framework, and improving 
communication with the international development community.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
  The authors are grateful to two referees for their constructive 
comments, and thank Karry Jiao, Poppy Bardwell, and Jing Gu 
for their help. The views expressed are those of the authors 
alone and do not represent those of the China Development 
Research Foundation (CDRF).
1 Jiantuo Yu, Research Fellow, China Development Research 
Foundation (CDRF), China.
2 Evan Due, Senior Advisor, China Development Research 
Foundation (CDRF), China.
3 The Tributary System adopted by China could be seen as a 
traditional pattern of foreign aid. 
4 Grants and interest-free loans are extended from China’s state 
finances, whereas concessional lending is provided through the 
policy banks.
5 Here we use the estimated net disbursement of foreign aid as 
Chinese Net ODA.
6 Chapter 37 (English translation).
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